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Introduction
On October 1, 1990, two months after Iraq's surprise invasion and annexation of Kuwait had put the United States and other members of the international community on a collision course with the Saddam Hussein regime, President George H.W. Bush spoke to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in New York. He described Iraq's brutal aggression against its neighbor as "a throwback to another era, a dark relic from a dark time. " Noting that Saddam
Hussein had waged a "genocidal poison gas war" against Iraq's restive Kurdish minority during the 1980s, President Bush hinted that if it ultimately proved necessary to liberate Kuwait by force, the United States and its allies could face Iraqi attacks with chemical weapons-highly toxic chemicals designed to incapacitate or kill.
This looming threat made it all the more important to conclude the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a multilateral treaty banning the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical arms. Both as Vice President under Ronald Reagan and as President himself, Bush had played a leading role in the negotiation of the CWC, and he was now determined to make it a reality. A year earlier, in September 1989, Bush had come to the UN General Assembly to present new U.S. proposals designed to speed the conclusion of the treaty. Now the possibility of war with Iraq gave additional urgency to this goal. "The Gulf crisis, " President Bush told the General Assembly, "proves how important it is to act together, and to act now, to conclude an absolute, worldwide ban on these weapons. "
The CWC was the culmination of a 70-year effort to ban chemical arms, which are widely considered indiscriminate and inhumane. World War I was the first conflict to involve the large-scale use of toxic chemicals, including "choking agents, " such as chlorine and phosgene, which irritate the lungs and cause them to fill with fluid so that the victim asphyxiates; "blister agents, " such as mustard gas, which produce painful chemical burns and blisters on the skin; and "blood agents, " such as hydrogen cyanide, which starve the tissues of oxygen and cause rapid organ failure. would not become a full party, subject to all the rights and obligations of the treaty, until the Senate gave its consent to ratification by a two-thirds majority vote. The requirement in the U.S.
Constitution that the executive branch of government obtain the approval of the Senate to enter into treaty commitments gives the legislative branch a prominent role in the making of foreign policy. In addition to granting-or withholding-its consent, the Senate can provide advice in the form of legislation accompanying a treaty that interprets certain provisions and specifies how they should be implemented by the executive branch.
The fact that treaty ratification requires a supermajority of 67 votes in the Senate makes it one of the most challenging tasks facing a U.S. President, who often must devote considerable time and effort to achieving an objective that typically pays few immediate political dividends.
In the case of the CWC, the task of shepherding the treaty through the ratification process fell to President Bush's Democratic successor, William J. Clinton, who took office one week after the signing ceremony in Paris. 1 For various reasons, the CWC proved to be far more controversial than was originally anticipated, and it was not until 4 years later, in April 1997, that the Senate finally gave its advice and consent to ratification. This case study examines the ratification process in detail and addresses the following questions. How did the U.S. Senate finally come to ratify the CWC? Who were the key players and what positions did they seek to advance? How did the shifting political landscape shape the process and the outcome?
Policy Drift on the CWC
After President Clinton took office in January 1993, the submission of the CWC for Senate consideration was delayed for several months while the new administration prepared the detailed article-by-article analysis that customarily accompanies a treaty. Other factors also pushed the CWC to the back burner: President Clinton focused initially on domestic issues, such as reviving the weak U.S. economy, and his foreign policy agenda was dominated by crises he had inherited in Iraq, Haiti, and Somalia. The White House also faced delays in getting its senior political appointees confirmed by the Senate.
As a result, it was not until November 23, 1993 , that the President formally submitted the CWC to the Senate, which referred it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC). Although the SFRC has the lead on arms control treaties and is responsible for drafting the resolution of ratification that accompanies a treaty when it comes up for a vote on the Senate floor, 
The Administration Miscalculates
Despite the bad omens, the White House decided to move forward with the CWC ratification process. Senate Majority Leader Dole had promised to schedule a floor vote on the treaty
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"within a reasonable time" after it was reported out of committee, but he became preoccupied with his decision to run for the Republican Presidential nomination and never found time for the treaty on the Senate calendar. 16 On the night of September 11, 1996, Republican Presidential candidate Dole sent a letter to Senator Lott warning against "illusory" arms control agreements and urging the Senate to withhold its consent to CWC ratification until all potential U.S. adversaries had ratified the treaty and the U.S. intelligence community could guarantee its ability to detect even minor violations. 17 The floor debate on the treaty had already begun, and a ratification vote was scheduled for September 14. On September 12, however, informal tallies indicated that in the charged partisan atmosphere immediately preceding the November election, the CWC would fail to get Given the approaching deadline for entry into force of the CWC, executive branch officials began to discuss whether the President should recall the Senate after the election for a special lame-duck session to consider the treaty, but this idea was rejected. Instead, mid-level administration officials drew up a game plan for CWC ratification that was reviewed by the Deputies Committee, an interagency panel at the deputy secretary level. Approval of the game plan in December 1996 launched an executive branch-wide campaign for CWC ratification.
18
Negotiating Under Deadline
After President Clinton's re-election in November 1996, the renewed effort to obtain Senate ratification of the CWC became the first foreign policy challenge of his second term. Although ratifying the treaty in the few months remaining before the treaty entered into force would be an uphill battle, the President's national security team recommended unanimously that he make the effort. Not only had Clinton staked his prestige on the CWC, but administration officials believed that failure to ratify the treaty would signal an American retreat from the world and undermine U.S. leadership in combating weapons proliferation, terrorism, and other transnational problems.
Given the high stakes, the President concluded, "We cannot afford to fail. " 19 After the long struggle the previous year to get the treaty reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the administration now found itself back at square one. This time, however, the White House decided to accord the CWC the high-level, focused attention that had been lacking over the previous 3 years. 20 President Clinton committed to making a major ACDA to the White House to serve as special advisor to the President on CWC ratification.
All three officials worked closely with SFRC staff director Edwin Hall and other members of the committee staff to obtain whatever information or decisions were needed from the executive branch.
Senator Helms, for his part, was in no hurry to take up the CWC. In a letter to Senator Lott on January 29, 1997, he recommended that the Senate consider the treaty only after addressing several "top Republican priorities, " such as reorganizing the State Department, reforming the United Nations, and deploying a national missile defense system. 21 Helms also intended to make the Clinton administration pay for his humiliation in April 1996, when the Foreign Relations
Committee had voted down his proposed resolution of ratification and passed an alternate version lacking poison pill provisions. In his letter to Lott, Helms wrote, "I believe that the starting point for any further discussions on the CWC must be the resolution of ratification which I presented to the Foreign Relations Committee on April 25, 1996. " 22 The chairman was clearly preparing to refight the battles of the previous year.
With the April 1997 date for entry into force of the CWC rapidly approaching, the White House tried to persuade Senator Lott to overrule Helms and schedule the treaty for a vote on the Senate floor without a formal vote in the Foreign Relations Committee. 23 The Majority Leader, however, had Presidential ambitions and found himself in a political bind. Although he did not want the Republican Party labeled as being in favor of chemical weapons, he also worried that bypassing Senator Helms would discredit him with the more conservative members of his own caucus. As a result, Lott chose not to challenge the chairman's prerogatives or reveal his own position on the CWC. 24 According to an analysis by John Parachini, "The longer Lott kept his views private, the more the partisan debate over the treaty continued, and the higher the political price the Clinton administration needed to pay for its eventual passage. " conditions proposed by Helms, one by one. "It was a tall mountain to climb, so we started in on it, " Bell recalls. "The negotiating was done in good faith and there was mutual respect on both sides, but it was still tough going. " 31 Berger and Bell held four negotiating sessions with the members of the Senate task force and four at the senior staff level, totaling about 30 hours of discussion. During the talks, it turned out that some of the supposed problems with the CWC did not actually exist, so it was possible to drop them. In other cases, Bell was able to satisfy Senator Helms's concern directly or find an alternative solution that was close to what he had in mind. Sometimes Bell and
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Billingslea went back and forth with various formulations until they found one that was ac- In an attempt to offset the influence of the CMA, CWC opponents recruited another trade association, the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), a leading lobby for small businesses. After NFIB officials expressed concern that the CWC might impose regulatory burdens on small chemical companies, opponents of the treaty in the Senate claimed that the NFIB opposed ratification. An NFIB spokesman later told a reporter, however, that after speaking with
Clinton administration officials, "It is now our belief our members are not going to be impacted. " Although the State Department and ACDA were unhappy with this condition because it might empower a future President to use tear gas in a manner inconsistent with the CWC, they were unable to block it.
The RCA issue was only one example of how the NSC staff 's negotiations with the Senate were generating tensions within the Clinton administration. State Department and ACDA officials, as well as arms control advocates on Capitol Hill, questioned some of the bargains that Bell had made with the Republicans, accusing him of being more concerned with getting the treaty through the Senate than with ensuring its effectiveness. For example, one of the conditions that Bell accepted would prevent international CWC inspectors from removing samples from chemical industry sites on U.S. territory for analysis in overseas reference laboratories.
Critics of this concession argued that because other countries were likely to follow the U.S.
lead and adopt the same unilateral restriction, there was a risk of significantly weakening the CWC verification regime. 43 Given the political realities in the Senate, however, Bell believed that he had to meet the Republicans more than halfway if the treaty was to have any chance of passage. Senator Helms declared that if all five of these conditions were included in the resolution of ratification, the CWC would at least "do no harm. " At a news conference on April 18, however, President Clinton stated that four of the conditions were "treaty killers" because they would either violate the CWC or prevent the United States from ratifying. 45 Although the fifth condition on rejecting inspectors was not strictly a poison pill, the White House considered it "bad policy. " 46 Administration officials stressed that they had bent over backwards to address Republican concerns about the treaty by accepting 28 of the proposed conditions. For this reason, senators who had hesitated to vote for the CWC in 1996 should now feel comfortable doing so in 1997.
Unanimous Consent
In early April, Senators Biden and Helms reached agreement on the set of unrelated foreign policy measures that were the chairman's price for releasing his hold on the CWC. Reversing years of opposition, the White House accepted the Helms plan to abolish ACDA and fold its functions into the State Department, along with those of USIA and USAID. The administration also agreed to certain Helms demands regarding the payment of U.S. arrears to the UN, UN reform, and the resubmission of two modified arms control treaties to the Senate for its advice and consent. 47 Both sides denied an explicit linkage between the administration's foreign policy concessions and Helms's agreement to allow a floor vote on the CWC. As Rebecca
Hersman observes, however, the timing of the deal "clearly improved the atmosphere for the treaty's passage. " before the treaty was due to enter into force internationally. 50 The resolution of ratification (Senate Resolution 75) contained 33 conditions and understandings, of which the 28 conditions already accepted by Senators Helms and Biden were not subject to change. 51 The remaining five conditions on which the two sides still disagreed would be treated as separate amendments, with no substitutes or changes allowed. Senator Helms insisted that it was incumbent on the Democrats to strike the "killer" amendments from the resolution of ratification before it went up for a vote. On April 23 and 24, there would be 18 hours of floor debate, including 10 hours on the CWC, 2 hours in closed session for classified discussions, and 1 hour on each of the five amendments. After the floor debate, the Senate would take a voice vote on the 28 agreed conditions, followed by individual roll-call votes on the five amendments, and finally a roll-call vote on the resolution of ratification itself.
On the one hand, the fact that the most serious challenges to the CWC were in free-standing amendments meant that treaty supporters would need only a simple majority to defeat them; on the other hand, passage of any one of the "killer" amendments would sink the treaty. "If this was baseball, we had to bat five for five, " Bell recalls. "That was the procedural price we had to pay to get the unanimous consent resolution, which bounded the problem and assured us that we wouldn't get filibustered on the floor. Instead, the treaty would be dealt with in two days with no further amendments. " 52 
A Surprise Guest
The April 4 pep rally at the White House, which had been attended by retired generals, former secretaries of state, and other distinguished Republican leaders, had attracted considerable media attention but had not produced the hoped-for increase in support for the CWC among Senate Republicans. As a result, the Clinton administration was still unsure whether or not the treaty had enough votes to pass. A senior official admitted, "Our view is that it's very close. It could go either way. " 55 Preoccupied with the impending vote, President Clinton believed that another White
House event would be needed to push the CWC over the top. He therefore scheduled a press conference at 9:00 a.m. on April 23, the day the ratification debate was due to begin in the Sen- White House press corps. Recalls Bell, "The press assumed that this was brilliant choreography on the part of the administration-that we had kept our surprise guest secret until the last minute. " 57 As Dole was speaking, the debate over CWC ratification was under way in the Senate.
Senator McCain entered the well and asked Senator Biden, who was making a statement, to briefly yield the floor. He then shared the news that "Senator Dole, former Majority Leader, has just announced his support of the treaty with the changes that have been made, which the Senator from Delaware [Biden] was able to achieve in this agreement. I think this is a very important expression of support and one that I feel will be very much respected by our colleagues on both sides of the aisle. " 58 Senators Helms, Kyl, and other CWC opponents were shocked by this unexpected development, but they still believed they had the votes to defeat the treaty.
The next challenge facing the Clinton administration was to get the current Majority Leader, Senator Lott, to announce his position on the CWC. Because Lott was expected to swing six to eight Republican votes, his support was considered vital to ratification. On April 24, Lott told the press that the administration's willingness to accept the 28 conditions had made CWC ratification a close matter for him, but he refused to make his position known until after voting began on the "killer" amendments. 59 He also said that he needed assurances that Articles X and 
Voting on the "Killer" Amendments
The Senate votes on the five free-standing amendments took place in the late afternoon of April 24, 1997. Although the Democrats believed that they had enough votes to defeat all five amendments, they could not be absolutely sure, and in a few cases the margin appeared uncomfortably close. Senators Biden and Lugar stood in the well of the Senate and urged their colleagues to vote against the amendments, while Senator Kyl lobbied in favor of them. By an unhappy coincidence, the votes on the amendments took place on the same day that Vice President Gore hosted an annual garden party with a few hundred guests at his residence in the Naval Observatory complex. When Bell told Gore about the impending votes and that he might have to come to the Senate to break a tie, the Vice President replied, "Of course I'm here if you need me. " As each of the five amendments came up on the Senate floor, Bell tried to get a sense of how the vote was going and whether or not Gore's presence would be necessary.
The first amendment, to delay U.S. ratification until countries such as North Korea, Iraq, and Syria had ratified, failed by a vote of 71 to 29. In a floor statement after the vote, Senator
Lott finally announced that he would support the CWC when it came up later that night. "The United States is marginally better off with it than without it, " he said grudgingly. 61 Now that endorsements by both the former and current Majority Leaders had made it politically safe for Republican senators to vote for the CWC, the White House was increasingly confident that it would win on ratification, but first it had to defeat the remaining "killer" amendments. inspection of any facility on U.S. territory, declared or undeclared, that another member state believed was engaged in prohibited activities. This condition was retained in the final version of the CWC implementing legislation that passed both houses of Congress in the fall of 1998. In the view of arms control advocates, Kyl's provision was likely to be adopted by other CWC member states and would therefore weaken another key element of the treaty's verification regime.
